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The welfare eects of trade have been a subject of examination for a long time. In the
pre-1970 period, neoclassical trade theory occupied much of the literature. In neoclassi-
cal trade theory, resources are mobile within countries, but immobile across countries,
and countries' factor endowments, technologies and preferences drive production and
trade. In traditional models of trade, markets are perfectly competitive, and trade un-
ambiguously improves welfare; not necessarily for each individual, but on an aggregate
level. During the 1980s, starting with the new trade theory, models have taken market
imperfections into account. One strand of this literature employs general equilibrium
models of monopolistic competition; such models proliferated following the seminal pa-
per by Krugman (1980). Models of monopolistic competition assume that rms behave
like monopolists and do not take strategic interactions into account when deciding on
prices or outputs. These models have become very prominent in trade theory as they
could explain intra-industry trade, empirically a signicant share of trade between sim-
ilar countries, that traditional models of trade failed to explain. These models show
that economies of scale and product variety are further channels through which trade
can improve welfare. Recently, such models have been extended as to incorporate rm
heterogeneity; see Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).1
The other strand of the literature is comprised of the reciprocal dumping models devel-
oped by Brander (1981), and Brander and Krugman (1983). These models are Cournot
models and focus on strategic interactions which models of monopolistic competition
do not take into account. These models have been extended in many ways, but their
role in trade theory has remained much less in
uential than that of either perfectly or
monopolistically competitive models of trade; see Neary (2009, 2010). The reciprocal
dumping models argue that trade may occur even in the absence of either compara-
tive advantage or product dierentiation, but they fail to address many of the classic
questions of trade theory (Bensel and Elmslie 1992; Neary 2009). As for the predictions
about the welfare eects of trade, they are not immune against assumptions concerning
the market structure.
Many of both monopolistic competition and reciprocal dumping models assume quasi-
1In these models, rms are heterogeneous in their productivity, and each rm has to incur xed costs,
rst to develop a dierentiated product, then to market the product in foreign countries. Therefore
only the more productive rms will be protable and export. Such models demonstrate that trade
reallocates market shares from inecient to ecient rms which is another source of welfare gains.
1linear preferences and the existence of a perfectly competitive industry that eectively
buers all factor price eects so that trade has no impact on factor markets. While
this is a signicant sacrice, in particular compared to traditional models of trade in
which the change of factor prices is at the heart of the analysis, its remedy is not
straightforward. The dilemma is that if rms are suciently large, the monopolistic
competition setup which assumes that rms take their industry environment as given
is not appropriate anymore. Allowing for market power, however, also has implications
in a general equilibrium setup which are not easy to model. For example, a very large
rm may have an in
uence on factor prices and may take this into account. When we
allow for this eect, the rm even has to take into account that it has an in
uence on
a country's GDP.2
At the end of the day, the important question is at which stage rms play strategi-
cally. In monopolistic competition models, they do not play strategically at all. These
models thus seem to underestimate strategic eects. In a model in which rms have a
substantial in
uence on factor prices, they play even strategically on the GDP level,
an implication with which we do not feel very comfortable because it seems to over-
estimate the role of strategic eects. In order to reconcile general equilibrium eects
with trade under imperfect competition, Neary (2007, 2009) and Neary and Tharakan
(2008) have suggested that rms are small in the large and large in the small, that is,
rms take factor prices as given, but they do not take prices in their own industry as
given. Thus, they exercise market power in the commodity market they are operating
in, but they have no in
uence on factor markets. This approach allows to study factor
price changes originating from imperfect competition in a general equilibrium frame-
work. We follow this approach in the current paper as we also nd it reasonable that
rms compete for resources without taking account of their in
uence on factor prices
(and thus on national income), but that they do know very well the role they play in
their commodity market.
An important predecessor of our paper is the in
uential book on market structures and
trade by Helpman and Krugman (1985). They consider trade both under oligopolistic
and monopolistic competition in general equilibrium. While no general theory of im-
perfect competition exists, they develop results on the eects of trade that hold by and
large in several models. An implicit assumption in their models is that rms do not
2Taking this eect into account leads to severe technical diculties; see Neary (2009) for discussions
of these diculties.
2anticipate any in
uence on factor prices, even if only a few rms and industries exist.3
They also consider free market entry as we do, but their sucient conditions for gains
from trade focus on outcomes and not on primitives. In Peter Neary's framework, the
number of rms in each industry is given, so entry is not modeled.
In this paper, we want to make progress on two issues. First, we integrate trade and
imperfect competition into a general equilibrium framework by also modeling the mar-
ket for rm assets. In order to do so, we sacrice generality and extend the famous
Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson (DFS) model, Dornbusch et al. (1980) to oligopolistic
competition such that we do not take industry structures as given, but determine them
endogenously.4 Second, we want to develop a better understanding how the eects of
trade relate to the primitives. In our model, capital and labor play dierent roles, and
there are economies of scale, and thus commodity markets are imperfectly competi-
tive.5 The capital market is the market for rm assets, and capital is thus used to
establish rms while labor is used to run the established rms. Industries dier w.r.t.
their input requirements, both for capital and labor. We nd that an equilibrium that
equalizes factor prices may exist if countries are similar, and an equilibrium may exist
in which factor prices do not equalize if countries are suciently dierent. In the rst
case, both countries diversify such that they produce all goods; in the second case, each
country specializes and produces only a certain range of goods. Surprisingly, special-
ization is the potential troublemaker in our setup. We demonstrate the relatively mild
conditions under which trade will unambiguously improve welfare mutually if factor
prices equalize, but these are not sucient in case of no factor price equalization. The
reason is that market entry is excessive, and trade changes factor prices such that entry
becomes more protable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
and discusses the autarky equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the implications of trade
for two cases, (i) the case of factor price equalization (Subsection 3.1), and (ii) the
3In an early paper on imperfect competition in general equilibrium, Gabszewicz and Vial (1972)
assume that consumers get a share of rm outputs for their inputs, and these goods are then traded
among consumers. While this avoids the modeling of factor markets, rms do not maximize prots
but the real wage of their shareholders.
4See Romalis (2004) for a model of monopolistic competition in a DFS framework. See also Dornbusch
et al. (1977) for a (one-factor) Ricardian version of their model.
5Neary and Tharakan (2008) also have a model with two factors of production, but the factors of
production in their model play a dierent role.
3case of no factor price equalization (Subsection 3.2). Section 4 investigates how our
results generalize when we allow a more general demand structure. Section 5 oers
some concluding remarks. For convenience, we have relegated most of the proofs and
technical details to the Appendix.
2 The model and the case of autarky
As in the DFS model, we consider a continuum of goods which are indexed by z and
dened over the interval [0;1], and we assume that households are symmetric and their
preferences are Cobb-Douglas. Our model wants to focus on the supply side eects, and
this is the reason why we keep the demand structure of the model as simple as possible
in the main body of the paper and assume that expenditure shares are identical across
commodities. This allows us to specify the utility function such that U =
R 1
0 ln(^ y(z))dz
where ^ y(z) denotes per-capita consumption of commodity z. The aggregate output of
industry z is Y (z) = L^ y(z) where L denotes the number of workers in the economy
(which has to be replaced by L + L when countries trade). This preference structure
leads to an inverse demand function p(z) = I=Y (z); where I denotes income, and p(z)
is the price of good z. Firms in this industry use labor for producing output and capital
as to establish a rm. The prot of rm i in industry z is equal to
i(z) = (p(z)   (z)w)yi(z)   r(z): (1)
The input requirement of labor is equal to (z) in industry z; w denotes the wage. Each
active rm has to make an investment of size (z) as to set up a plant where (z) > 0;
r denotes the rental rate. yi(z) is the rm-level output such that Y (z) =
P
i yi(z). All
rms within industry z are symmetric such that Y (z) = n(z)yi(z), where n(z) denotes
the number of active rms in industry z.6
Before we proceed we have to be more specic on the index z, and for this reason we
rank industries in terms of their capital input requirements without loss of generality.
We assume that industries can be ranked such that the capital input requirement is a
dierentiable function of z,7 and we introduce the following
6Since pY (z) + pY (z)Y (z)yi(z) =  I(n(z)   2)=n(z)Y (z)2  0, rms compete by strategic substitutes
in the sense of Bulow et al. (1985).
7Assuming dierentiability of the  ranking simplies our analysis. However, all our results do also
4Denition 1 Industries are ranked such that z decreases with the capital input re-
quirement : 0(z)  0.
Note that we do not make any assumption how labor input requirements behave. Let
us now consider the domestic country which has a capital endowment of size K, used to
establish rms, and a labor endowment of size L, used to produce output. All variables
referring to the foreign country will be denoted by an asterisk. We are now interested in
the autarky equilibrium. Even in autarky, some further assumptions have to be made
to ensure that rms will be established in each industry and that industry outputs are







We make the following
Assumption 1 K > 2(0)  2
2
which ensures that the capital stock is suciently large so that a sucient number
of rms can be established in all industries under autarky.8 Assumption 1 is not too
demanding and can be understood best for constant capital input requirements, (z) =
, across industries. In this case, 2(0) = 2
2 = 2, and Assumption 1 requires that
the capital endowment allows to establish at least two rms in each industry.9
All entrants to an industry play a two-stage game: in the rst stage, they decide on
entry and carry the investment cost, in the second stage they decide on rm output.10
hold if the  ranking is almost everywhere dierentiable.
8Since the market for rm assets is perfectly competitive, rm ownership is diversied and capital own-
ers take r as given. They have no in
uence on the behavior of rms, and thus the price normalization
problem cannot arise as in Dierker et al. (2003), and Dierker and Dierker (2006).
9Note that the demand specication does not support a monopolistic outcome due to constant expendi-
ture shares such that at least two rms are required to avoid corner solutions. See also Assumption 2.
10Helpman and Krugman (1985, p. 85) nd that the Cournot approach is useful but also lacks realism.
However, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) have shown that this approach is strategically equivalent
to a game in which rms determine capacities rst, and then compete by prices. This means that
our results are equivalent to a game in which a rm, after having made an investment, hires labor
to produce a maximum output before it will compete by prices with its rivals in its industry.
5We solve the game in the usual backward induction fashion, and we follow Neary (2009)
such that each active rm maximizes its prots for a given wage and rental rate, and
for a given income level; this re
ects the assumption that rms are large in the small,
but small in the large. The rst-order condition is
@i(z)
@yi(z)






Y (z)2 = 0:






A further innovation of our paper is that we model the market for rm assets such that
capital is used to establish rms as long as entrepreneurs expect non-negative returns.
This has the implication that all rms will make zero prots in equilibrium. If prots
were positive (negative) in an industry, capital demand would rise (decline), reducing
(increasing) industry prots due to entry (exit) to that industry. Furthermore, also the
rental would increase (decline), but this eect is not taken into account by potential
entrants. Ignoring the integer constraint, we now can determine market entry by the
zero prot condition:
i(z) =  pY (z)(z)yi(z)
2   r(z) =
I







Note carefully that market entry is excessive in our setup such that rms are too
small from a social perspective as shown by the industrial organization literature; see,
for example, Mankiw and Whinston (1986). Of course, given economies of scale, the
socially optimal solution would be to allow only one rm charging marginal costs.
This rm would have to be subsidized, though. But even if a social planner could
6control only market entry and not rm behavior, this literature has shown that entry
is excessive when rms compete  a la Cournot, and the sum of consumer surplus and
prots could be increased by reducing the number of rms below the free entry level.11
The reason is that entrants steal business from their rivals, and rms become smaller,
and consequently, excessive entry does not increase consumer surplus substantially but
reduces prots to zero.
Our analysis will be conned to laissez-faire equilibria, and given our demand speci-
cation, we want to consider a model with competition between rms so we make
Assumption 2 n(z)  2
which implies that
p
r(z)=I  1=2. Assumption 2 guarantees that rm and industry




















To close the model, we need to determine the autarky factor prices, and thus we now
consider factor markets. Labor demand of industry z is equal to







and capital demand of the same industry amounts to






11We do not endogenize competition policies in this paper. St ahler and Upmann (2008) discuss the
role of nationally allowing free entry or restricting local market access in a two-country model.
12We could also accommodate a perfectly competitive industry such that (1) = 0 which would lead
to Y (1) = I=(1)w.
7Before we proceed to the determination of factor prices under autarky, we want to
explore how factor demands and the capital intensity change across industries. Factor











where (z)  0 denotes the elasticity of  w.r.t. z. Not surprisingly, more capital-
intensive industries have a larger capital demand. Furthermore, they have a lower
labor demand, irrespective of the labor input requirement. The capital intensity

























Lemma 1 The capital intensity increases with the capital input requirement.
This result is also not surprising. However, the capital intensity in our model should not
be confused with capital intensities in trade models of perfect competition employing
linear-homogeneous production functions. Capital is used only to establish rms, and
labor is used only for production. Therefore the capital intensity in our model gives
the ratio of establishment inputs to operating inputs.
We are now ready to establish the equilibrium conditions for both factor markets. As




























must hold. The model is closed by the income denition I = wL + rK. Note that we
have a large (innite) number of equilibrium conditions for all commodity markets and
two equilibrium conditions for the factor markets. The last condition follows from all
other ones according to Walras' Law, and hence both the labor market and the capital






Without loss of generality, we can use the rental rate as a numeraire in our model such













The wage-rental ratio is the larger the larger (smaller) is K(L). As can be seen from
eq. (4), there are now two dimensions along which countries may dier in our model.
First, as in classic models, countries may dier with respect to their per-capita endow-
ment which we dene as k  K=L for the domestic country (and k  K=L for the
foreign country). Second, the size of the capital stock is also crucial as a larger capital
stock allows more rms to be established. In classic models, autarky wages coincide if
countries' per-capita endowments coincide. This is not true here { if relative endow-
ments coincide, autarky wages coincide only if absolute capital endowments are also
the same (which implies that labor endowments are also identical).
We can also compare the wage-rental ratio with the per-capita capital endowment.
Assumption 1 implies K > 2
2 which immediately leads to wL > K; see eq. (4). Thus,
we observe that the wage-rental ratio is larger than per-capita capital endowment,
w > k, and the income share of labor is larger than the income share of capital which
seems to be conrmed by empirical evidence. Finally, we can easily compute the autarky
income as I = wL+K = K2=
2 which shows that a country's autarky income increases
overproportionately with its capital stock.
93 Trade in general equilibrium
We now turn to the integrated markets in which each rm will sell in both countries
and commodity prices are the same across countries. A crucial question will be whether
factor prices will equalize as a result of trade, that is, whether trade can also be a
perfect substitute for factor mobility in our setting. Factor price equalization is also
closely related to the existence of a cone of diversication, that is, whether all goods
are produced within a country. In our model, we have to explore rst how factor price
equalization (or non-equalization) is related to the existence of active rms in the two
countries. We nd that factor price equalization is crucial for diversication.
Lemma 2 There is no coexistence of domestic and foreign rms in industry z if factor
prices dier.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
The intuition for Lemma 2 is that dierent factor prices imply dierent cost struc-
tures, and thus dierent cost structures imply that one country will not host rms
of an industry due to an inferior cost structure, and rms of that industry will be
geographically concentrated in the other country.13 Of course, due to factor market
clearance in both countries, this cannot be true for all industries so that each country
will attract some industries. In what follows, we will show that two dierent types of
equilibria, an equilibrium with factor price equalization and an equilibrium without
factor price equalization, may exist. Then we will scrutinize the eects of trade for
both cases, factor price equalization (FPE) and no factor price equalization (NFPE).
We start with the FPE case.
3.1 Factor price equalization
In the FPE case, let the common factor prices be denoted by w and r, respectively.
Identical factor prices imply that rms are indierent where to locate, but on aggregate
13Helpman and Krugman (1985, p. 103) discuss in Chapter 5.4 the possibility that the scale of pro-
duction may be dierent across countries when factor prices do not equalize and the production
technology is not homothetic so that rms of dierent scale may coexist in a free entry trade equi-
librium. The specic structure of the DFS model does not include this case.
10their location decision has an eect on (equalized) factor prices. The aggregate number
of active rms now comprises both the one located in the domestic country and the







where Iw = w(L + L) + r(K + K) is now world income. We let the rental rate r be




























The second-last line follows from using the factor market condition for capital and
eq. (5). Balanced trade requires that production is equal to consumption, that is,
wL + K = 
p
Iw, and thus leads to the same condition. Furthermore, since Iw =
w(L + L) + (K + K), this condition follows also from the same exercise for the
foreign country for which the trade balance condition leads to wL+K = Iw 
p
Iw.
Hence, the four factor market conditions and the two trade balance conditions are not
independent, but lead to a single condition. This condition requires that total domestic
production, which is equal to domestic real income, should stand in a certain relation
to world income. Note that there is only one  which will fulll this condition once
income levels are determined. However, there is a range of dierent industry structures,
that is, dierent combinations of n(z) and n(z), which will meet this requirement such
that K =
R 1
0 n(z)(z)dz and K =
R 1
0 n(z)(z)dz. Hence, we have some ambiguity in
terms of industry structures, but not in terms of the relation of national incomes to
world income.
Our analysis so far has assumed that an equilibrium with factor price equalization
exists. We can demonstrate both the existence and the set of factor endowments under
which such an equilibrium exists by considering a fully integrated economy in which
factors of production are mobile across countries. In this fully integrated economy,
11the wage determination is similar to the case of autarky, except that it now takes
all endowments into account and factor markets should clear in aggregate. Similar to




w(L + L) + K + K









Of course, this is consistent with our analysis above. We could derive eq. (7), the FPE
wage, also from eq. (6) because K + K =
R 1
0 (n(z) + n(z))(z)dz; we can substitute
n(z) + n(z) given by eq. (5) as to rewrite K + K which leads to the same result.
We now conduct the same thought experiment as originally developed by Dixit and
Norman (1980) and ask whether we can reconstruct the same resource allocation if
factors of production are immobile across countries. As it is well known, the FPE set
can be constructed as a convex set of the sectoral employments of labor and capital
in the fully integrated economy. Lemma 1 has demonstrated that the capital intensity
increases with the capital input requirement, and thus the factor price equalization set





































































Figure 1: Factor price equalization
12Kw and Lw denote the world factor endowments with capital and labor, respectively.
Figure 1 shows that an FPE equilibrium will always exist because part of the diagonal
00 belongs to it. Compared to DFS, however, the autarky wages along this diagonal
are not identical in our model except at the point of perfect symmetry, W. All factor
allocations which guarantee equal autarky wages are given by the dotted line through
W.14 Furthermore, the capital stock in both countries must be larger than 2(0) so as
to guarantee that all goods can be produced in autarky. A common feature of models
with more goods than factors is that the production pattern is indeterminate, and this
is also true in our model as we have demonstrated above. Suppose that point P is the
allocation of internationally mobile factors across the two countries in a fully integrated
economy. Since it is within the FPE set, it can easily be reconstructed without factor
mobility but with trade. Drawing a line through P with the slope of the wage-rental
ratio w yields combinations of factor allocations for which the relative income across
countries stays constant.15 Since preferences are homothetic, point C on this line, that
is, the intersection with the diagonal 00, gives the point of implicit consumption of
factors which depends on the share of world income only. As in DFS, although we
cannot pin down production patterns, we can unambiguously determine the net factor
content of trade. In Figure 1, the domestic country is a net exporter of capital services
and a net importer of labor services.
We now compare the wage-rental ratio before and after trade liberalization, and we
nd that trade increases (decreases) the domestic wage-rental ratio if
k
k < (>)




A similar condition holds for the foreign country. Note that the RHS of eq. (8) is
unambiguously larger than unity; hence, a necessary, but not a sucient condition
for the wage-rental ratio in the domestic country to decline is that k > k. We may
conclude that the wage-rental ratio may decline with trade if the domestic country is
very capital-abundant. If countries are not too dierent in terms of their per-capita
capital endowment, the wage-rental ratio will go up in both countries. Furthermore,
note that both countries cannot experience a decline in the wage-rental ratio because
14This line can be derived from equalizing the autarky wages which leads to K(Lw   L)(K   
2) =
(Kw   K)L(Kw   K   
2).
15Note carefully that w > kw  Kw=Lw, where kw denotes the world per-capita endowment, also
holds in the integrated economy.
13a decline for the domestic country requires k > k which would denitely lead to
an increase for the foreign country. Moreover, both a positive and a negative sign in
condition (8) are neither in con
ict with eq. (7) nor with the construction of the FPE
set. This leads to
Proposition 1 The wage-rental ratio will increase in both countries with free trade
if countries are not too dierent with respect to their per-capita endowments. If coun-
tries are substantially dierent, the country with the higher per-capita endowment may
experience a decrease in the wage-rental ratio, while the other country will denitely
experience an increase.
Let us put this result more in context. Since the rental is the numeraire in our model, a
decline in the domestic wage-rental ratio implies that domestic income declines. World












and larger than the sum of autarky incomes. Therefore, if a country experiences a
decline in the wage-rental ratio, this country also becomes less in
uential in terms of
its share in world income.
An increase or decrease in a country's income, however, does not indicate welfare eects
of trade as these depend also on the changes in commodity prices. The welfare eects,
however, are not straightforward. On the one hand, markets become larger due to
integration, and thus rms become more ecient. On the other hand, Proposition 1
has shown that the wage-rental ratio will increase in at least one country, if not in both
countries, and an increase in the wage-rental ratio makes production more costly. If it
increases in one country only, this country will experience a substantial increase in its
share of world income and will thus be a more dominant player than before. Therefore,
we have a trade-o between larger markets carrying more rms and an increase in
production costs. The last eect is not present in models that allow for a perfectly
competitive industry which absorbs all labor market eects.
We can compare the change in rm size in more detail. Let the cases of autarky and
trade with factor price equalization be denoted by the superscripts a and t, respectively.




















where kw  (K + K)=(L + L) denotes the world per-capita endowment. If capital
input requirements are identical across industries, that is, if (z) = , then (z) = 1
and yt
i(z)=ya
i (z) = k=kw. Firm size in all industries will increase (decrease) in the
country that has a larger (smaller) per-capita endowment. If 0 < 0 at least over some
range, then there is one and only one ~ z for which 
 =
p
(~ z) due to the Intermediate
Value Theorem. The change for z = ~ z is again yt
i(~ z)=ya


















we nd that the change in rm size is larger (smaller) than k=kw for goods that are
capital-intensive, z < ~ z, (less capital-intensive, z > ~ z). We cannot even rule out that
k=kw is so large (small) that domestic rm size will increase (decrease) in all industries.
Helpman and Krugman (1985) emphasize, in Chapter 5.4, the benecial role of ratio-
nalization when market entry is free, but this rationalization eect is not guaranteed
in our model due to the endogenous response of the factor markets.
The ambiguous change in rm size is an indication that we require a thorough welfare
analysis. For this purpose, let us rst consider a single commodity z and the change
in per-capita consumption due to trade. As before, per-capita consumption is denoted
by ^ y(z). Consider the domestic country. We already know the wage-rental ratios and












































The dierence between per-capita consumption under free trade and under autarky is
therefore equal to
15^ y








2)(K + K   
2)(z)
: (11)
If 0 = 0 for all z, then 
 =
p
, and so ^ ya(z) = ^ yt(z) for all z. Hence, identical capital
input requirements across all industries imply that per-capita consumption does not
change, and this has a clear welfare eect:
Lemma 3 If (z) = , then trade does not change per-capita consumption of each
commodity, and thus does not change welfare.
This case implies that the (positive) eects of a larger market and the (negative)
eects of an increased real wage just compensate each other for each industry. Notably,
the case of identical technologies has been referred to as the featureless economy by
Peter Neary; see especially Neary (2009). In his model, there is no market entry and
only one factor of production (labor). He concludes for the case of a featureless world
with completely symmetric countries that trade does not change welfare because labor
supply stays constant and thus wages rise. This result is independent of the number
of rms. Lemma 3 shows that this is also true if (i) market entry is endogenous and
(ii) the investment costs do not dier across industries. In particular, note that rms
employ two factors of production in our model and that this result does not depend on
the specication of labor input requirements. The crucial dierence to Peter Neary's
analysis is that trade also encourages excessive market entry.
What happens if the capital input requirements strictly decrease with z over at least





which suggests that per-capita-consumption will decrease for capital-intensive goods
and decrease for all other goods with trade. We summarize our results in
Proposition 2 If trade equalizes factor prices, then per-capita consumption of com-




An interesting question is now whether the change in per-capita consumption is positive
for the majority or the minority of goods. To illustrate this, Figure 2 assumes that 0 < 0
16across the whole range, and plots three dierent downward sloping curves for
p
(z).




(1), coincide so as to
make them comparable. In the left panel,
p
(z) is a linear function of z; thus, (z) is
linear-quadratic in z. 
 is the area under the linear graph of
p
(z). Due to linearity,











(0))=2 (note that the
horizontal length is unity). Therefore, if
p
(z) is linear in z, ~ z is exactly equal to 0:5, so
per-capita consumption of goods z 2 [0;0:5] goes up, whereas per-capita consumption


















































Figure 2: Change of per-capita consumption
In the right panel, the linear graph is contrasted with two alternatives, a concave and
a convex graph. As can be seen easily, the concave graph implies a larger 
, as the
area under the graph is larger than the area in the linear case. Therefore, ~ z must be
larger than 0:5, and so the goods experiencing an increase in per-capita consumption
outnumber those experiencing a decline. On the contrary, a convex graph implies a lower

, that is, only less than one half of goods will experience an increase in per-capita
consumption. This is potentially worrying, but we have to be careful here. All we have
done so far is to look upon the sign of the change, but not yet on its strength. Trade
will improve welfare on an aggregate level if the per-capita consumption reductions are
only very moderate, while the increases in per-capita consumption are substantial.








a(z))dz  0 , v 
Z 1
0
ln((z))dz  0: (13)
where (z)  ^ yt(z)=^ ya(z) is the relative change of per-capita consumption from autarky
to trade. Unless 0 = 0 for all z, we know from Proposition 2 that (0) > 1 > (1) > 0.
Since we use a specic utility function, we can go into the details of potential gains
from trade. We nd:











Proof: Integration by parts leads to


































Theorem 1 identies two eects that contribute to the gains from trade. First, we know
that (i) the increase in per-capita consumption is largest for z = 0, (ii) the decrease
in per-capita consumption is largest for z = 1, and (iii) ln((0)) > 0 and ln((1)) < 0.
Therefore, the eect [ln((0)) + ln((1))] shows how the extreme changes contribute
to gains from trade: if the increase in per-capita consumption of the most capital-
intensively produced goods overcompensates the decrease in that of the least capital-
intensively produced goods, then this eect contributes positively to the gains from
trade such that [ln((0)) + ln((1))] > 0. Second, Theorem 1 shows that a negative
covariance between z and the relative change of per-capita consumption also makes
a positive contribution to the gains from trade. So, on average, the relative change
in per-capita consumption should not accelerate with the change in capital intensity.
This eect deals with per-capita consumption changes in between the two extremes,
18and since we consider the covariance here, we just have to take the average correlation
between z and the relative consumption change into account.
Note carefully that we do not require both eects to contribute positively, but at least
one eect should be suciently strong and positive so as to overcompensate the other
one if the other eect is negative. Both eects will depend on the behavior of the
capital input requirements. In order to shed some more light on the role of (z), we
now establish sucient conditions for welfare improvement dependent on the behavior
of capital input requirements. We summarize these ndings in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 In the case that trade equalizes factor prices, overall welfare unambigu-
ously improves if the ranking of capital input requirements is not concave (00  0).
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
The intuition for Corollary 1 is as follows. We observe a structural change due to
trade. Proposition 2 shows that per-capita consumption declines for goods which are
not produced capital-intensively; these have become overproportionately expensive, and
this eect is not overcompensated by the larger market, because the investment costs
are not substantial. Conversely, per-capita consumption of capital-intensively produced
goods increases, because a larger market can accommodate more rms. Consequently,
00  0 guarantees that capital input requirements do not fall underproportionately
with z so that a suciently large number of commodities experiences a suciently
large increase in per-capita consumption.16
Note carefully that even if these welfare conditions are felt as not too demanding, we
would like to make clear that gains from trade do not come natural in our setup. From
a social perspective, there is excessive rm entry, and this distortion is the larger the
larger is the capital input requirement (z). Since the wage-rental ratio will increase, at
least for one (dominant) country, this eect is even emphasized as it becomes relatively
less costly to establish a rm. Theorem 1 demonstrates that this eect is likely to be
overcompensated by the increase in the size of the market.
We can also compare our welfare result to the reciprocal dumping model of Brander and
Krugman (1983). They have a model of symmetric countries, one factor of production,
16Note that the sucient condition 00  0 also implies the convexity of
p
(z) in Figure 2 because
d2p
(z)=dz2 =  0(z)2=4(z)3=2 + 00(z)=2
p
(z)  0.
19and households have quasi-linear preferences. Since there is perfect competition in one
sector, trade has no eect on factor prices. They show that trade is always welfare-
improving if market entry is free because rms unambiguously become larger and climb
down the average cost curve.17 Our model takes factor price changes into account, and
it shows that the overall welfare eects of trade can still be positive.
3.2 Dierent factor prices
In the last section, we have characterized the trade equilibrium which equalizes factor
prices. In this section we scrutinize an equilibrium in which factor prices continue to
dier after trade liberalization. The analysis of trade without factor price equalization
is usually not on the agenda if an FPE equilibrium exists. However, we will show in
this subsection that trade may not lead to mutual welfare gains, so this case deserves
a thorough analysis.
We know from Lemma 2 that dierent factor prices imply geographical concentration
of industries. Thus, we are now interested in the possible specialization patterns for the
equilibrium factor prices. Given Lemma 2, an industry will be hosted by the country
having the lowest price for the equilibrium factor prices. Let p(z)(p(z)) denote the









if production takes place in the domestic country; and a similar expression can be
written for the foreign country. Since all factor markets have to be cleared, there must













17Brander and Krugman (1983) also consider restricted trade by using trade costs. For the case of
free trade, that is, zero trade costs, trade is also welfare improving when market structures are
exogenous. This is not true for high trade costs. When market structures are endogenous, trade is
always welfare improving, irrespective of the size of trade costs.
20The pattern of specialization is then straightforward, but we need a slightly stronger
assumption on the behavior of the capital input requirements, that is,
Assumption 3 0 < 0 across the whole range for the NFPE case.
We nd:
Proposition 3 In an NFPE equilibrium, one country has the higher equilibrium wage
and the lower equilibrium rental compared to the other country. This country hosts
industries in the range z 2 [0; ^ z], and the other country hosts industries in the range
z 2 [^ z;1].
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
We can also identify which country is more capital-abundant such that these patterns
may emerge. We know from Lemma 1 that the capital intensity will increase with the
capital input requirement, which is negatively related to z, that is, the capital intensity
will decrease with z. This will also be true along the range of commodities produced
within each country. Assume that the domestic country produces in the range z 2 [0; ^ z];
in this case, 0(z) < 0 for z 2 [0; ^ z] and 0(z) < 0 for z 2 [^ z;1]. Using the denition of






(^ z) > 
(^ z):
Proposition 3 has shown that the domestic country must have a lower rental than
the foreign country if it produces in the capital-intensive range, and this is the reason
why (^ z) > (^ z). Therefore, the capital intensity in both countries behaves like in
Figure 3.
Factor market clearance implies that relative factor demand for capital is a weighted
average of capital intensities. Thus, it follows immediately from the Intermediate Value
Theorem that the weighted average will be higher (lower) in the country hosting the
capital-(labor-)intensive industries, and this must be matched by the per-capita capital
endowment. In our case, it follows that k > k. Additionally, there are clearly lower
bounds on the dierence in relative factor endowments. In order to make Figure 3
consistent with the relative factor endowments, a sucient (but not yet necessary)
requirement is that k  (^ z) and k  (^ z). Therefore we conclude:























Figure 3: Capital intensities in the NFPE case
Proposition 4 An NFPE equilibrium may exist only if countries are suciently dif-
ferent with respect to their relative capital endowments. If it exists, then the capital-
abundant country produces the capital-intensive commodities.
In the NFPE case, we nd that imperfect competition cannot reverse the specialization
patterns as they are well known from classic trade models. Furthermore, a direct im-
plication of Proposition 4 is that the capital-abundant country will be a net exporter
of the capital services and a net importer of labor services as embodied in trade.18
If we maintain our assumption that the domestic country produces goods in the range





















where world income is now Iw = wL + rK + wL + rK. Rearranging the capital
18See Brecher and Choudhri (1982) for this result in a Heckscher-Ohlin model without factor price
equalization.
22market condition and putting it into the labor market condition yields
L =
Iw^ z   rK
w
: (15)
A similar exercise for the foreign country gives
L
 =
Iw(1   ^ z)   rK
w : (16)
Rearranging these equations yields the trade balance condition, that is, the domestic
country's income should be equal to its production such that
wL + rK = I
w^ z:
So we have three equations, the two equations clearing the capital markets { one for
each country { and the trade balance. Furthermore, eq. (14) determines ^ z. In summary,
we have four independent equations, and, after using the domestic rental rate as a
numeraire again, that is, r = 1, four unknowns, w;w;r and ^ z, and we can show:
Proposition 5 If an NFPE equilibrium exists, it is unique.
Proof: See Appendix A.4.
What are the welfare eects of trade in the case of NFPE? Similar eects are at work
as in the case of FPE, that is, the eect of a larger market and the eect of a potential
increase in production costs. Additionally, countries now specialize completely in a
certain range of goods as indicated by Proposition 4. As to analyze the welfare eects,
we have simulated the model, assuming labor input requirements are constant across
industries, 8 z 2 [0;1]; (z) = 1. Also we assign a specic function to (z), that is,
(z) = 2 z. We know from Corollary 1 that trade would improve welfare in this setup
if factor prices could equalize. The reason is that 00 = 0 guarantees positive gains from
trade in the FPE case. Table 1 summarizes the results of our simulation.
<Table 1 about here.>
Table 1 shows the factor endowments, the relative factor prices, income levels and the
welfare change indices v and v for both countries. In all ten simulations, the factor
23endowments are outside the FPE set.19 The simulations dier such that we increase
the capital stock of the capital-abundant, domestic country by 10. We see that this
increase in the domestic capital stock increases both the wage-rental in the domestic
country under autarky and trade. However, the increase under trade is much larger.
Both countries gain from trade in the rst three simulations, but once K = 60 is
reached, it is only the foreign country that gains, and these gains increase when the
domestic capital stock is increased further. For the domestic country, the gains from
trade become smaller over the whole range and turn negative after simulation # 3
which shows that trade may reduce welfare and proves
Theorem 2 In the case that trade does not equalize factor prices, the welfare eects
can be negative even if parameters are such that they are unambiguously positive in an
FPE equilibrium.
Theorem 2 is remarkable because it is in sharp contrast to the common view that
specialization is the key for gains from trade. In our setup, this is not true. So why
does trade make the domestic country even suer if it does not equalize factor prices at
the same time? Even if the wage-rental ratios were similar across the two countries, the
distortions due to excessive entry would be more substantial in the domestic country
because this country hosts the capital-intensive industries. Furthermore, the increase
in the wage-rental ratio even exacerbates these distortive eects because it becomes
relatively less expensive to establish a rm and more expensive to run it which leads
to a reduction in rm size. This eect will be pronounced when the capital stock is
relatively large compared to the foreign country. In the FPE case, the distortive eect
is symmetric, but in the NFPE case, it is the domestic country which creates more
distortive eects than the foreign country. For a large enough asymmetry, this eect is
able to eat up the domestic gains from specialization.
4 Extension to general demand structures
In the last sections, we have assumed that each commodity has the same income share.
This assumption has allowed us to focus on the role capital input requirements play for
welfare with and without factor price equalization. In this section, we discuss whether
19The computations of these simulations are available upon request.
24and how our results extend to the case of general demand structures. We keep the Cobb-
Douglas assumption as in DFS, but now we allow income shares, denoted by (z), to
dier across goods. More formally, utility is now given by U =
R 1
0 (z)ln(^ y(z))dz with
R 1
0 (z)dz = 1. This generalization has straightforward implications for the number of
rms entering industry z, rm-level outputs and labor and capital demands of industry





























What do dierent income shares change from the viewpoint of rms and potential
entrants to an industry? With (z) = 1 as in the previous sections, the ease of entry
into an industry was determined only by the capital investment. With dierent income
shares, also the size of (z) plays a role. It determines the market potential of an
industry, and thus a larger  makes investment easier. It is thus now the ratio of
investment costs to the market potential which determines the ease of entry to an
industry. Consequently, let us dene (z)  (z)=(z) as the eective investment cost,
that is, the investment cost  corrected by market size. We now rank industries such








(z)dz, and we nd
similarly that income levels are equal to I = wL + K = K2= 2 under autarky and
equal to Iw = w(L + L) + (K + K) = (K + K)2= 2 under trade and factor price
equalization.20 We make similar assumption for (z) and   as we did for (z) and 
,
respectively, such that at least two rms are active in each industry.
Let us now explore whether and how our former results on labor and capital demand
20Note that we still assume that the ranking of eective investment costs leads to a dierentiable
function which declines with z. The corresponding (z) is a function, but neither continuous nor
dierentiable; it is a cloud in the (z)   z|space. Therefore, any integral involving (z) is not
necessarily Riemann-integrable, but since (i) utility and technology are bounded from above and
(ii)
R 1
0 (z)dz = 1, these integrals are Lebesgue-integrable. Lebesgue-integrability guarantees that
the basic theorems on expectations and covariances as we will use them below hold.
25and capital intensities carry over to the case of general demand structures. As for factor
demands, it is now not clear that labor (capital) demand increases (decreases) with z








and has thus the same properties as before (see eq. (3) with (z) replacing (z)). There-
fore, our results in Subsection 3.2 carry over with (z) as the eective investment cost.
We have already demonstrated in this subsection that welfare results can be negative,
so there is no need to go any further with this using general demand structures.
Instead, we now want to focus on the welfare results with factor price equalization
when demand structures exhibit dierent income shares. As before, let us rst consider
how per-capita consumption changes with trade.21 We nd that the dierence between
per-capita consumption under free trade and under autarky is now equal to
^ y





(K    2)(K + K    2)(z)
; (18)








(z)dz is now the weighted average of the square root
of the eective investment costs, while 
 was the unweighted average of the square root
of investment costs. However, due to the Intermediate Value Theorem, it must still be
true that per-capita consumption increases for low z's and decreases for high z's. Since
  is now a weighted average, the weights also play a role for the strength of the eects
on per-capita consumption. This can also be seen by the generalized condition for




(z)ln((z))dz  0: (20)
21We let the rental rate r be the numeraire as in the previous cases.
26Using (20), we can now turn to the welfare eects with general demand structures.






















0 (z)dz = 1, and the rest of the proof for
R 1
0 ln((z))dz follows from Theorem 1.
Compared to Theorem 1, there is a third term which contributes to gains from trade.
Trade improves welfare also if the increase in per-capita consumptions occurs in those
industries in which the income share is large. This does not have to be true across
all industries but should hold on average as indicated by the respective covariance.
Since  still plays a role, a positive correlation between income shares and increases in
per-capita consumption is clearly welfare-improving.
We now turn to sucient conditions which trace back gains from trade to the behavior
of the eective investment costs and the income shares. For this purpose, let us dene









which measures how demand changes for commodity z due to trade. In particular, we
know that trade will be welfare improving if
R 1
0 (z)g(z)dz  0, because this condition
implies that the autarky consumption bundle is also feasible under trade. We can now
develop two dierent sets of sucient conditions which have in common that they
require a positive correlation between income shares and the change in consumption
patterns.
Corollary 2 In the case that trade equalizes factor prices, overall welfare unambigu-
ously improves if
27(i) the income shares and the measure of demand changes are positively correlated
(Cov[(z);g(z)]  0) and the ranking of eective capital input requirements is not
concave (00  0)
or
(ii) Cov[(z);ln((z))]  0 and the ranking of eective capital input requirements is
suciently convex such that 00(z)   0(z)2=2(z) .
Proof: See Appendix A.5.
Both conditions now refer to the ranking of eective capital input requirements. If this
is suciently convex, the number of commodities experiencing a substantial increase in
per-capita consumption is suciently large. Furthermore, these changes should apply
to those commodities which, on average, play an important role as measured by their
income shares. Thus, all results from the previous sections carry over to a large extent
to the case of general demand structures. However, they require the qualication that
it should be more the important commodities that benet from positive changes. This
does not have to be true for each commodity with a high income share, but it should
hold on average as measured by the covariance.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has shown that the general equilibrium eects of factor price changes can
play a crucial role for the welfare eects of trade. We have developed a model in which
the industry structure is endogenous and depends on factor endowments. Hence, also
the market for rm assets is endogenous in our model. In an equilibrium in which
factor prices do not equalize, the general equilibrium eects may even make a country
worse o. However, gains from trade are guaranteed under relatively mild conditions if
trade equalizes factor prices, but this does not mean that per-capita consumption will
increase across the board.
Overall, our paper has led to new insight emphasizing the important role feedback ef-
fects from factor markets can play for trade liberalization in the presence of economies
of scale. In particular, free entry is excessive in our setup and is the potential trouble-
maker. Our paper thus oers a framework for analyzing trade under imperfect com-
petition when (i) strategic interactions between rms are regarded as important while
28(ii) product dierentiation is regarded as less important. In this sense, our model is
complementary to the well-known monopolistic competition models. In these models,
rms do not act strategically, and hence entry is not subject to the business stealing
eect, and an increase in product variety is an important source for gains from trade.
The simplicity of the DFS framework does not allow us to endogenize the product
space, and we know from the industrial organization literature that the eect of free
entry is ambiguous for welfare if rms compete with dierentiated products. However,
there is no reason why the business stealing eect should completely disappear in a
more general model with strategic interactions on an industry level.
Of course, whether strategic interactions matter or not is, in the end, an empirical ques-
tion. In models of monopolistic competition, however, there is no room for a decrease
in per-capita consumption. This is also true for heterogeneous rm models because
all surviving rms will have become more ecient. A decline in consumption of some
commodities cannot be explained by trade in this setup, and if it happens, dierent
technological progress across industries and/or changes in tastes are the usual suspects.
Our model can show that trade changes factor prices and also makes production in some
industries overproportionately costly. This eect is even pronounced when trade does
not lead to factor price equalization.
Our model is static in nature, so we do not consider how capital formation and techno-
logical progress will aect trade patterns in the long run. On the one hand, an increase
of the wage-rental ratio is potentially bad news for capital formation. On the other
hand, research and development (R&D) are a xed cost as well, so our assumption of
constant capital input requirements cannot hold in the long run. If R&D is considered
to be capital-intensive (or skilled-labor-intensive), then a decrease in the wage-rental
ratio makes R&D investment less expensive, so we should expect more innovation. Long
et al. (2011) consider the role innovation and trade play in an oligopolistic model with
strategic interactions of potentially heterogeneous rms for output, entry and R&D.
However, they do not consider general equilibrium eects from factor markets. We leave
it to future research to explore how the eects of R&D can be incorporated into an
oligopolistic general equilibrium model of trade.
29Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2





i(z). The rst-order conditions are
@i(z)
@yi(z)











= p(z)   (z)w










Y (z)2 = 0:
All rms within industry z are symmetric such that Y (z) = n(z)yi(z) + n(z)y
i(z).
Using symmetry, we nd that
yi(z) =
Iw(n(z) + n(z)   1)(n(z)w   (n(z)   1)w)




Iw(n(z) + n(z)   1)(n(z)w   (n(z)   1)w)
(z)(n(z)w + n(z)w)2 ;
leading to maximized prots
i(z) =
Iw(n(z)w   (n(z)   1)w)2




Iw(n(z)w   (n(z)   1)w)2
(n(z)w + n(z)w)2   r
(z) = 0;
which are equal to zero in equilibrium. Dierentiation of maximized prots w.r.t. n(z)














which proves that coexistence is impossible for dierent factor prices.
30A.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Welfare unambiguously improves if the consumption bundle under autarky is also fea-




t(z)   ^ y
a(z))dz  0;
the sign of which is equivalent to
Z 1
0


































































































31A.3 Proof of Proposition 3



































0 (z) > 0:
At any intersection of (z) and (z) in the =   z{space, either 0(z) > 0(z) or
0(z) < 0(z). If 0(z) > 0(z), prices are lower for all z < (>)^ z in the domestic
(foreign) country and it must be that
p
rw > w. On the contrary, if 0(z) < 0(z),
prices are lower for all z < (>)^ z in the foreign (domestic) country and it must be
that
p
rw < w. Hence, there can be only one ^ z as two intersections would warrant p
rw > w and
p
rw < w at the same time.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
A direct implication of Proposition 3 is that a certain vector of factor prices implies a
unique ^ z. Suppose that ^ z is given. Dierentiating the equilibrium conditions
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The Jacobian determinant of the matrix in (A.1) is equal to 2433LL and is thus
unambiguously negative. The unambiguous sign implies that there is one and only one
vector of factor prices for a given ^ z and, due to Proposition 3, one and only one ^ z for
any vector of factor prices, and the equilibrium is unique.
A.5 Proof of Corollary 2
For part (i), we use the approach that welfare unambiguously improves if the consump-
tion bundle under autarky is also feasible under trade which leads to
Z 1
0

































Of course, ~ g0(z) = g0(z) and ~ g00(z) = g00(z). The proof for convexity of g(z) is similar to
the one for convexity of f(z) in the proof of Theorem 1, see Appendix A.2. Convexity














due to Jensen's Inequality Theorem.
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which diers from v that does not involve the income shares. We are interested in the
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< 0:














































00(z) > 0 if 
00(z) < 0;









34The restriction on the minimum number of rms implies that K > 2 
p
(z), so we
nd that  is convex if
20(z)2
0(z)2   2(z)00(z)





because this implies that (i) K is always large enough, and (ii) 00(z) < 0. Now consider
function ~ (z) which is equivalent to (z):
~ (z) =
K    2
K + K    2







Of course, ~ 0(z) = 0(z) and ~ 00(z) = 00(z). Convexity of (z) implies also convexity of








K + K    2
K + K    2
K    2 = 1
























































35First, we observe that K is positive because 0(z)2 2(z)00(z) > 0 and 0(z)0(z) > 0,
given our assumption about the behavior of the (z)-function. Second, the restriction
on the minimum number of rms implies again that K > 2 
p
(z), and we nd that
1 +
20(z)2
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